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Copgressman HAMlLTU N ¥!SH, JK., of New York 
DFS - This is the first session with Congressman Fish_ on Thursday the 
26th of June 1975, at ten after two in the afternoon. 
SL - Father Shea and Lynch are present. 
HF - Now there are some I'd just show my ignorance if I was asked. 
Well I thought there was a couple that I wasn't going to be able 
to answer very well, but I don't know --- if you are not going 
to like the answer don't use it. 
LAUGHTER 
TM - No, not anything like that at all, this is totally yours and the 
transcripts, when we get them transcribed, we'll get them right 
back to you to edit and clean up. 
HF - In case something occurred to me since then, that's the idea. 
DFS - And it's totally confidential, you know, until you ,read them over 
chen do with them what you want. 
TM - This is your product and we're just assisting you in putting it 
down. 
DFS - And of course our role is really passive because your were the . 
historical actor and figure cf the time and your recollections are 
the historical source, so we are simply here to jog yo u r memory, 
that's all o Would you like then, M~. Fish, to start with number 
one, so to speak? 
HF - Yes. 
DFS - · Fine, we~d like to ask you to recall what was your original 
prediclictioi about impeachment, let's take for example on the 
31st of July, 1973, when Drinan introduced that first resolution, 
what was your reaction to that? At that early stage? _ 
HF - As I recall the grounds for the Drinan resolution were - very 
specific, were they not, didn't have to do with Cambodia, the 
fact that we had just learned ~bout the secret bombing in Cambodia 
two or three years before tha~? , 
DFS - That's correct. The resolution itself was a very general one, ,- ~ - -
there was no · specifications. 
HF - Oh, there was none? 
TM - Yeah, it was just a one-liner. 
DFS - One line is all. 
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HF - the thing. Because then you did get for the first time the defin-
itive judicial determination that limited his stand on executive 
priviledge. But I never really in my mind focused on the person 
of the President, until such time as the resolutions were intro-
duced in October. 
TM - You recall, Congressman, in the early proceedings, the Judiciary 
Committee discussed what is an impeachable offense? 
HF - Yes. 
TM - And we got a brief from Mr. Doar and his staff and we got a brief 
from the White House and a brief from the Justice Department. 
And wherein they took different positions of the narrow view and 
·the broad view. The narrow view being an offense had to be an 
indictable offense, criminal offense before it becomes an impeach-
able offense. And the other view being on something very serious 
but something that would not be necessarily be indictable or 
criminal. 
HF - We had the committee report on Constitutional grounds for impeach-
able offense, I frankly don't recall the Justice Department's 
brief, specifically, my recollection is that it was far closer to 
the inquiry staff's monograph on this issue and I don't remember it 
contributing anything new to my thinking and frankly I read that 
committee monograph very carefully and including the back of it, 
the last couple of pages, they had t heir source material. Because 
I think that it is one of the great documents to come out of the 
entire inquiry and the trouble is that every sentence carries so 
much weight, I mean one sentence is the essence of four or five 
pages of a book by Roal Berger, I remember checking on it. It is 
so condensed that it takes a tremendous concentr~tion and under-
standing as you read it, and reread it. But I thought it was 
brilliant and it was the position that I adopted. 
TM - Did you develop in your own mind an actual position of what is an 
impeachable offense? In other - words it does not have . to be an 
indictable offense? 
HF - Oh, no. It doesn't have to ~~he ele t of a crime in it. 
According to that study, I'll have to get that book out and read it 
to you but I thought that it had language in there about the 
offense against the state, the governmental system, very very 
broad language in that inquiry staff report is what I adopted 
personally as my standard of what constitutes an impeachable 
offense. 
DFS - In your opening statement on TV that Thrusday evening, you mention 
there were elements, that it be extremely serious, that it be 
against the political system -- the constitutional government, 
but that also it be recognized as such by a broad majority. 
HF - Can I first say that that is not original with me, if you recall 
it's a very thin book, published by a law professor in June --
DFS - Black? 
' ' 
Fish - 4. 
HF - Black, this is Professor Black, and this is verbatim maybe with 
/ ~ 'a word or two changed out of Professor Black· ' s· book on impeachment. 
. That was published just a month or two before we started on 
, . televised hearings. And I thought he was right on the target. As 
to regards the third element, I'd already come to that conclusion 
some time before. That was based on a January speech at Anders 
College by Archibald ..C.o~ in which he said that it must have a legal 
and moral basis acceptable to the American people. But what I 
think he was referring to then and subsequently in his Jtine '74 
Phi .-Beta Kappa spee.£11 at Harvard was the way he went abo1rt--tir!s 
~ust as important as the ultimate vote. And the credibility 
of the proceedings -- they could not be partisan. It • couldn't 
be a get President Nixon and therefore to me it translated it 
shouldn't be a defend the President either. You just have to lay 
your party allegiance to one side. Because they had to go about it 
this way because eventually what you had to be was acceptable to th 
American people. They would not permit us to undo the results of a 
general election unless there was a moral element and a legal basis 
to such radical surgery. I think it should be very clear that the 
distinction between a grounds for impeachment that is morally and 
legally acceptable to the American People and basing your judgment 
to impeach or not to impeach upon a popular sentiment if it can be 
expressed as clear majority. The one, the first is the correct way 
to approach this and really it's almost needn't be said. Obviously 
you have to have a legal basis and I think there should be a moral 
basis as well. But I certainly made it clear, l~tters in every 
opportunity that I had to speak, that very early on over the 
Christmas break in 1973, that I personally come to the decision 
that you could not conduct this by a poll and popular sentiment 
had nothing to do with it. It was a very very defined constitu-
tional responsibility which the public had no bearing on it what-
soever. Likewise your party affiliation had nothing to do with it. 
It was a constitutional obligation. 
DFS - Let's say that one has an objectively serious legal and moral 
offense demonstratable by evidence, but which offense was not so 
apprehended or understood by the American people. Now would that 
have stood the test of impeachibility? 
HF - You mean if it also was very very serious and offended the consti-
tutional system? 
DFS - That's right. But not so -understood. It simply couldn't be sold 
-- the American people weren't aware of this. 
HF - Well, of course that didn't occur but I think that's important. 
If they didn't, why didn't they? Then it would be the fault of 
the pro~ess. One of the great credit~ to Mr.~ Rodino is that in 
taking as long as we did, during our inquiry, he was maturing the 
concept of impeachment. Not only among the members of the 
Committee, but among the public as large. I think we all started 
out with impeachment, it sounds a little like cholera. As far as 
the public is concerned, it's not something you ever studied in 
civics class, vaguely knew it was there. And so Rodino dld mature 
the thing. But I think you raised a good point. But I think I'll 
stick to my answer you just can't~go around removing the President 
of the United States in office without · the people understancing 
what you are doing. In this case certainly there was a great deal 
Fish - 5. 
HF - of publicity on the ooint. 
DFS - I was intri g ued too by your comments to Lucas about the First 
Amendment possibly protecting not only the right to tell the truth 
but the right to tell a lie. Now say that Nixon obviously told a 
lie. Did that have any relation to the First Amendment? 
HF - You mean he had the right to tell a lie? 
DFS - Did he? 
HF - Well he did. He most certainly had a right. Yes. But it is a 
judicial offense.--Lying reapetedly to the American people. 
DFS - Is lying itself, even repeated lying itself impeachable? 
subject of the lying? 
Or the 
HF - Yes. This came out because in the Ford conformation hearings as to 
what you know in the way of national security issues and I think 
that his position was that you just don't tell the full story. But 
that you shouldn't lie. Of course I never thought of the lying as 
a separate indictable offense. I don't think it was ever mentioned 
in any of the provisions of article one or article two. I just 
think it was part of the whole picture. In that itself it was not 
a substantive grounds of an article of impeachment. 
TM - The sec o nd article talks about the public misrepresentations but 
that was it. That was the extent of that. 
HF - If that was all that had happened, you just could find a lie, but 
of course it was just part of the coverup, really is what it was. 
Except that it was done over national television instead of in the 
oval office. But surely this is merely a continuation of an 
attempt to maintain the coverup of June. 
DFS - Let me ask you as a layman, lawyer-wise, about your·•statement that 
"there was no smoking gun, the whole room was fi lle"d - ~i t h smoke." 
Now aoes that last phrase imply, or is that another way of refer-
ring to circumstantial evidence? 
HF - What I really had in mind is -- you know the words smoking gun 
had been used before against those who could simply not bring 
themselves short of a confession on tape or otherwise by the 
President that he was directly involved. That no matter how much 
evidence you had that as long as it wasn't directly involving him, 
they were unwilling to take that step, and I think just referring 
to this room being so full of smoke was not just the circumstantial 
evidence, it was the whole scene. That there was so much going on, 
so much we had, and that, and so many attempts to obscure and 
attempts to obstruct the inquiry, attempts to get us off on side-
tracks and to challenge our right to continue as we were. I was 
pretty sure that we weren't going to find the smoking gun, and I 
really guess I meant that there was enought smoke to spell out the 
pattern of events in which you could draw conclusions and· 
inferences from the gaps in the evidence that would be sufficient 
to warrant votin g for impeachment. 
c= 
Fish - 6. 
DFS - Let me read you a little quotation by another member of the 
coalition. "The hearings today, April 4, remind me of the 
advice of Abraham Lincoln when he said that if you want to stop a . 
church from being built don't attack the religion, but start an 
agrument over where the best location would be." "It appears to 
me that the strategy of the White House is to start an argument 
about procedural methods by the committee in an effort to divide 
the committee and make it appear that it is being unfair pro-
cedurally." Do you have any comment on that? 
HF - Well maybe so. I didn't think at the time that the White House was 
trying to divide the committee but certainly we spent • an awful lot 
of time on procedures and received an awful lot of advice as to 
what we should be doing and as to what we shouldn't be doing. How 
we should ,go on about it. 
DFS - Then how about the standards of proof? For example, Mr. 
Clair's clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
standard, how did you stand on that? 
st. ;• 
the Ford 
TM - In other words once you've come to your own definition of an 
impeachable offense, what degree of belief then do you apply to 
that? . 
HF - I eventually went/along with "clear and convincing" primarily 
because it seemed to be the one everybody could live with. I 
thought ~_ it was remarkable, the eqanimity of the committee, that 
did accept it and the counsel as well. But as I recall first of 
all I ruled out the criminal standard because we weren't dealing 
with a criminal matter. And since the trial was going to be in the 
Senate we really were usurping the Senate perogative, they would be 
the masters in determining their standard. I guess it goes back to 
just what we were saying, what was an impeachment inquiry? I 
decided it was just that. It was unique. It was an impeachment 
inquiry. That there was some analogy to a grand jury but you 
shouldn't use a standard of proof applicable to grand juries 
because we're not a grand jury ► Alot of our undertakings are not 
in secret and there is the President's counsel · throughout the 
entire evidentiary hearings. So the standard of proof applicable 
to the grand jury clearly would not be applicable. Criminal 
would not be applicable. And the more stringent ones wouldn't 
seem to be applicable either. So that certainly "clear and 
convincing~ would be needed anyway to reach the point of public 
understanding and acceptance that I felt was important. So I was 
perfectly happy to accept this. 
TM - Were you aware of any effort on the part of the White House to lay 
that type of device and strategy among the Republicans on the 
Committee? .In trying to encourage and engender debate on pro-
cedural matters, were you approached? 
HG - No, I was not aware of it. I think one of the remarkable things 
was that throughout this time ! ; didn't sence any change in my 
office's relationship with the ~executive branch. Now I never had 
the occasion to ever telephone either Erl i chman or Halderman when 
they were in office. But most of the daily matters that concerned 
.r1sn - ,. 
HF - this office with legislative or constituent work are done with 
people on the operating level in various departments and this 
went on without any change. We won a few and lost a few. And 
likewise the amounts of giants that were approved for projects 
in my district, local government, universities and whatnot there 
was no change. They didn't suddenly dry up nor did we suddenly 
get any more of it, and I don't recall any phone calls at all from 
any of the people in the Nixon White House at any time we were 
having these hearings, arguing over procedures. However, this 
doesn't mean that it didn't happen to other people. I knew 
nothing of what went on in the Democratic side of the Committee 
and their frequent cacuses. We had our caucuses secretly. But 
that too was a theme throughout those right up to the ' list of 
May in which the majority was very defensive in terms of the 
President and very partisan, I thought. 
TM - A majority of the minority. 
HF - Yeah, I don't know if anybody ever took notes of those meetings. 
TM - I took a few rough notes, as decisions were being made and we had 
to prepare things but generally not as to the substance of the 
discussions. 
HF - If you can bear with me a minute, I wrote some notes on a pad 
here that I thought bv look at your chronology 
DFS - .Very fine. 
HF - But it goes from the very first party line vote on the right to 
issue subpoenas bake in the fall and right through the vote on 
the 1st or 2nd of May '74 on our response to the President to the 
edited transcripts we received a day or so earlier. I think it 
reflected a strong party position here on both sides.·· The Repub-
licans were simply not willing to go along with a lot of these 
steps adopted by the Committee. 
DFS - I think as late as the 10th and the 18th of July, Hutchinson 
expressed himself in a Republican caucus as something to the effect 
that it was just inconceivable to him to have the Republicans 
consider impeachment. 
HF - I was there, inconceivable for a Republican Congressman to vote 
to impeach a Republican President. Well, I think that for the 
most of us by that time we just were amazed to hear it. And I 
\... - . -
translated it to mean it was perfectly conceivable for a Repub-
lican Congressman to vote to impeach a Democratic President. So 
I dismissed it as being too bad that he felt this way; it was not 
an idea that had ever, ever crossed my mirid. And that he had been 
unmoved by almost seven months of participation in this inquiry! 
DFS - Did you feel that you were at all being singled out by a remark 
like that or that someone else was or that it was just a general 
remark. 
( , __ 
1•1sn - o. 
HF - Ne, ne. I remember being in the room and I remember Mr. Hutchin-
sen ce~ing in and a few minutes at the end of the meeting, stand-
ing by the de~r and I had not been talking until he was recognized 
cause he ceuldn't stay long and he just said a few words and this 
was part of it. I did not participate in these discussions among 
Republicans to any great extent cause I just didn't like the fact 
that they seemed to want to have a Republican alternative. And 
I went back to my decision over Christmas was in this to carry out 
your constitutional obligation here, you had to put partisanship 
to one side. And so it was just inconceivable to keep trying to 
forge a Republican position as an alternative to what we were 
doing in Committee. I imagine that first decision to ' what response 
to take to the fact that President not complying to the request to 
the subpoena to the tapes was on May 1. There was a later time, . 
a few weeks later, you know Bill Cohen was the only one to vote 
on May the 1st and then a number of us joined him two or three 
weeks later when the second issue came up. Going back to the 
~question of what constitutes an impeachable offense, I think its 
interesting here what I wrote--"If impeachable conduct was to be 
confined solely to the indictable offenses, the standard that 
we'd set would be so restrictive that it would not reach conduct 
that might seriously affect our system. Next came the problem of 
what would be the appropriate burden of proof to apply. Some 
members of the Committee argued for a standard of probable cause, 
paralleling our role to that of the House of Representatives to 
that of a grand jury but here again the comparison to the judicial 
process only served to confuse the issue. Our business was not 
uniformly conducted in secret and respondent's counsel was present 
at every stage of evidentiary presentation. At different stages of 
impeachment proceedings, the House of Representatives assumes the 
role of the grand jury, prosecutor, jury and even the judg~, most 
of us con=cluded that something more strigent than a mere standard 
of probable cause should be a guide to an issue of this magnitude. 
To put the President of the United States and the American people 
through a potentially long and devisive trial demanded a higher 
burden." Some of us picking up on the argument that ~n impeach-
able offense was identical to an indictable offense, argued for 
a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. But most viewed impeach-
ment as a two stage process, for the Constitution clearly specifing 
that the trial be in the Senate which would decide its own pro-
cedures including the standard of proof. To impose the highest 
burden of proof known in our system of law_on the House deliber-
ations did not seem to be either advisable or consistant with our 
role under the constitution. The simple standard seemed most 
useful for our purposes, they are preponderance of the evidence 
or clear and convincing. In the end most of the members embraced 
the clear and convincing standard which again demonstrates a 
uniqueness and flexibility of the impeachment process. The 
President's counsel also viewed clear nad convincing as the 
appropriate standard for our committee's deliberations on the 
facts. The term has the advantage of being readily understand-
able by members of the House,many of whom are non-lawyers and 
more importantly by the American people. It was a workable 
meanin g ful standard. It should be emphasized that each m~mber 
is free to apply the standard of proof that he thought appropri-
ate. Just as ~ith the definition of an impeachable offense. I 
think that this was adopted by most. But there were those who 
(_ 
l'lSh - Y. 
HF - felt that they w~re the prosecutor and now we weren't the grand 
jury but what we were was the district attorney who had to decide 
in the confines of his own office wheth2r or not to take the case 
to the grand jury which really meant he had to decide the issue of 
guilt or innocence because you wouldn't take it to a grand jury 
unless you did fell strongly yourself that the party was guilty. 
Because that was a very tough thing, I think you were putting 
yourselves in the shoes of the Senate. But there is of course 
that role, there is the prosecutor role, there is the grand jury 
role. But of course if you start off saying that it's not a 
criminal proceeding, then you shouldn't look upon you!self as a 
district attorney. And that is what some committee members, 
Carlos Moohead for example, told me that's the standard he applied 
--· which makes it very tough, to particularly when you're not 
getting the evidence before you to go on the kind of evidence we 
had and to decide guilt. It really wasn't our responsibility. · 
DFS - Did you ever consider the so-called Ford Standard? 
the Douglas situation, some years ago? 
You recall in 
HF - Oh yes, --What ever Congress wants -- Well that is not in regard 
to the burden of proof that is . in regard to impeachable offense? 
DFS - That is correct. 
HF - No, I didn't take him seriously. I imagine there's quite alot of 
truth in what he said but fortunately we had be nefit of a cracker-
jack counsel to our committee as well as this impeachment inquiry 
staff that was put together. Really people of high caliber with 
two extraordinary gifted men heading it up. I think that is prob-
ably correct. Just like Rodino did not force the committee or ask 
the committee at any one time to sit down and discuss the issue 
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. We simply accepted 
the inquiry staff work product and we had this contribution by 
the President's counsel and the Justice Department and members were 
free to accept any or none of it. So in that sense he~s right. 
It's whatever Congress says it is. We did have before us this 
document prepared by John Doar and staff and that I find totally 
convincin8. 
DFS - Would you want to comment just at this juncture on Doar, St. Clair, 
Jenner, Garrison -- how you thought they performed in light of 
what they were expected to do? 
HF - Well, I think they all performed well. We didn't have that much· 
association with Mr. St. Clair. He was a silent participant in the 
evidentiary proceedings as I recall. But I thought that John Doar 
did a tremendous job, terribly painstaking, man of great poise yet 
never seeming to be ruffled, even though we knew he was physically 
exhausted. Jenner was a great constitutional lawyer in my books 
and really thought through these problems. And you know among the 
Republicans, some faulted Jenner for not disagreeing with Doar. 
To me this fact that the two of them sat down and worked things 
out and came to us in a common front gave strength to everything 
that the inquiry staff did. That these two giants agreed. And 
they certainly did in their give and take amongst each other 
effect a compromise that it wasn't solely one man's view or the 
( ,_. 
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HF - other; it was the combination of the two individuals that each 
had a high regard for the other. And to me to have that come in 
without the committee having to resolve disagreements between 
these two is tremendous asset to the whole proceeding. But I 
found that Mr. Jenner in just a very few words could capsulize 
things. It was certainly one of t he more influential factors on 
me throughout the proceedings. 
DFS - You :were out at ~ohen's home on Sunday cmorning with Cates. 
prompted your using Cates for that function? 
What 
HF - ~l d heard that he had given a presentation that ran some 5 hours 
to a Democrat on the committee and I had discovered that he was 
the principal person on the inquiry staff that had supervision 
over the aspect of the break-in and the cover-up and that he had 
a very strong case and was very frank about his views and he had 
a theory of the case and I wanted to hear it. At that time, I 
think Mrs. Cohen was in Maine so Bill was the babysitter that 
Sunday and we went out there. Who was there? Frank Polk? · 
TM - I think Frank did go. I remember I couldn't make it, I was out of 
the city that weekend . 
HF - But Frank and a couple of other fellows from the inquiry staff 
and he went on for about four hours and then he hadn't finsil1ed 
so we met again in a little room on the ground floor of the 
{ Capitol a couple of evenings later so he would finish his full t( presentation. And that was a big influence on me too because what 
1 
he did in effect was to take all the material that we had. It was 
\ nothing new, it was just a way of putting together the material 
' that we had presented to us in May on that issue. Eventually it 
became article one. He just put in a theory where he had an 
explanation for the gaps in his judgment. It was a iiausible 
estimate or guess as to what happened in the missing parts of our 
evidence based on just clustering known facts to arrive at some 
decision as to what was the most likely thing to have .happened. 
And to me it was a very rational, it was obviously just a theory 
of the case -- a very sensible, rational theory by a highly trained 
trial lawyer who had done exhaustive work in research in facts in 
this matter. I found it convincing. 
SL - How would you rate Mr. St. Clair's performance? 
HF - As I say he didn't really have much of a role during the eviden-
tiary presentation of the tapes, of the times we were just listen-
ing to the reading of those books and comments on them. His 
questions of witnesses was very good, a very fine trial lawyer 
but I didn't think much of his brief or the quite short argument 
that he gave us at the very end. I thought that he would go on 
for considerably more time. 
SL - What was your reaction when he pulled out the new transcript? 
That they had never seen before? At the very end, he pulled out 
two pages of the March transcript and said we've taken a ;econd 
look and these might be of use. 
C 
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HF - I really hadn't thought about that in so long. Did we accept it? 
Now I remember being annoyed but I don't really have too good a 
recollection now of it. But Garrison did a good job. I thought . 
he was suddenly thrown in and had only a few days to put together 
an argument and he just kept a few narrow issues and made people 
like me go back and test for a couple of days of what he had said 
and St. Clair had said in his argument against the evidence. 
Against what evidence was there. But I did give both of them very 
earful scrutny. I had help from the regular staff of the committee 
to go over it and so we could just take each one of their arguments 
and discuss what the counter argument should be and ~ee how much 
weitht we are going ~ogive them. 
DFS - Now of all the information and evidence that you heard and had gone 
through, which did you at the time find most helpful, or to put it 
in positive negatively, most damaging to the President? Witnesses 
or tapes or whatever? 
HF 
~{ 
- No, I~ find great difficulty in singling out anything. The tapes 
were certainly dramatic the first time we listened to them too. 
But they gave me headaches and particularly the long ones; I had 
terrible times, always had some asprin with me, cause I just got 
these splitting headaches and I get headaches in movies too. I 
i' \ 
thought it was the fact that watching the movie, now I realize it 
must be from listening. You know the tapes were liek listening to 
old time radio, the crackling voices and the uneven quality. Now 
I think the tapes were not in themselves all that damaging, it was 
really just part of a whole scene -- a whole pattern. I certainly 
think that the presentation by John Doar starting the 9th of May on 
those 38 volumes that they gave to us. That in itself was the most 
impressive. It was really overwhelming. That's why Cates was 
a help -- someone to pull it together. And having such familiar-
ity with it that he could pull it from all over the place and 
weave a plausible story. The least helpful! to me wa~, surprising 
enough, the live witnesses. And 1 · 6id been very much for ha~ing 
a great many witnesses. I wanted to have Haldeman and Erlichman, 
for example, despite what their counsel said. I thought it would 
be significant to me that they refused to answer any questions. 
I just wanted to not be told that they wouldn't answer but to 
actually see that they didn't answer. Because there we had 
witnesses that had testified in the Senate, and we knew what 
said in the Senate, we had a pretty good idea that they were 




the framework of our inquiry, that we knew that the Senate didn't 
know that once we did have these people. Really I got so bogged 
down in this stuff with the Bittman case and all those other people 
and I don't think we got the story from many of them anyway so it 
just wasn't . that helpful. Butterfield was a very very good witness 
DFS - One of the other members put it this way. He said that he thought 
that whereas Ford in his appearring before the Committee to be 
confirmed as Vice-President had brough his life, Nixon had brought 
his lawyers. And the latter turned him off so to speak. Did you 
ever have that dichotomy? 
C 
C 
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HF - No, I tell_you I did feel though a certain tenseness with Mr. St. 
Clair the prosecutor. That was my fault, I guess, I felt we 
shouldn't be, I didn't like the associate that he brought with 
him, I forget his name. The fellow who sat next to him all the 
time. 
SL - McHale? 
HF - McHale. But he was always looking at us as a defense counsel 
should, I suppose. He was staring at us and they both used the 
minority staff. And I just decided in this particular instance 
that there shouldn't be a Republican or Democratic side. I viewed 
our counsel as Mr. Jenner and he was there to help us seek the 
truth which was the sole purpose of this inquiry, but St. Clair 
was there as an advocate and we never really got particularly 
chummy with him. 
SL - If the tapes had never existed at all, do you think there would 
have been a clear and convincing case? 
HF - Yes, I do. It would have been much more difficult. It probably 
would have taken longer. It certainly would have been more 
controversial. I think we would have to rely then more on live 
witnesses than we did. I think we would have approached the whole 
case slightly differently. It was still there. I think the evi-
dence we -had was surrounded with the break-in, the next several 
says, alot of that was not from tapes but from testimony, LaRue's 
testimony, just what happened when they were all out there at 
Beverly Hills and breakfast on Sunday morning and the phone calls 
came in and the way it was explained to us, the positioning of 
where the President was and where Erlichman and where Mitchell 
was and what everybody said and did and the conversations after 
that. Almost on a daily basis the events that really_ led you to 
the conclusion that the President had to be in on it. Even though 
you didn't have the tape of the 23rd ••• 
SL - Since we're discussing the evidence, if I may I'd just like to 
quote here Theodore White and what would be your reaction to it? 
DFS - That's in his new book. 
HF - Which I am not going to bother to buy after reading that 
excerpt. 
SL - He said in his final sentence referring to you, "~ut he had he 
said an entirely open mind until sometime in May when the evi-
dence and facts and testimony began to build and build in a 
pattern of lawlessness that somehow went to the heart of the 
conservative philosophy was all about, law and order." 
HF - Yeah, I spendt about 40 minutes in this office with someone he 
sent around and that was the total interview. That was the total 
contribution and it wasn't like having had talks with the people 
who wrote for the New York Times, The New Yorker, and the.in-depth 
stuff. I think it was a very cursory meeting and that's the only 
(~ 
HF - asso~iation, I never saw White at all in the preparation of that 
book. I don't know if that's the only reference to me in that 
book but it is in your notebook. And I think it displays a 
preconception that he had of me. He had no business assuming that 
and really shows the lack of scholarship on his aprt. I mean if he 
had done any research at all in the Congressional Quarterly, he 
would have discovered for example, that my record in support of the 
President had fallen below 50%. And the Congressional Quarterly 
listed me as a moderate liberal -- that was me. It was just a 
silly comment. I don't know why he put it in there unless it was 
his knee-jerk assumption of what anybody named Hamilton Fish would 
feel like. That's all that I said, it's not a question of being 
not ture, it's just no help. 
DFS - How about the personal factors influence? For example, your fathe~ 
your wife, close friends, what role did they play say during the · 
increa~ingly crucial months of May, June, July? 
HF - Well of course I ~knew what my father was doing out there, raising 
money through newspaper ads and calling for fairness to the 
President. It didn't bother me, I didn't have any contact with 
him personally. I was for fairness to the President too. It was 
a little like his press secreiary would come out and say that he 
was not the protector of the President. Oh dear, anyway, I felt 
that was one of our jobs too. That's what th~ committee was doing. 
But I'm used to that so that didn't bother me very much. I'd say 
that most of my friends favored impeachment; my wife really didn't 
expre~i -iny opinion on this until July. She wasn't in on it 
really before that as far as expressing any personal opinious. 
DFS - Children? 
HF - Oh, I think yes. My oldest boy was convinced in favor eirly on 
of impeachment. The rest of the children did not express them-
selves. The question also asks constituents. As I say I had to 
rule them out as far as their concerning myself with what their 
views were. District politics, No, it would be the same thing. 
The two are bombined. Couldn't worry about that either. 
DFS - As you said, your district pretty well split right down the 
middle. 
HF - Yes, I thought so. It was definitely a no-win situation. So the 
only possible approach for me that jsut gave validity to the 
approach I took was that it couldn't be a factor. Obviously 
you~re going to lose, somebody said it's not a no-win, it's a 
lose-lose situation. 
LAUGHTER 
HF The mail of course was most-heavily for impeachment. 
were no threats that I know of. 
And there ·· 






Fish - 14. 
HF - I do that normally in Judiciary Committee work because we have 
the staff over there and it's all they can do in this office is 
to keep up with the mail and the matters before us in the House 
floor. Also my legislative aide only came on about April of '74 
so he really wasn't in on any of the matters before the Committee 
before that time. 
SL - We really haven't mentioned yet, is what is your reaction to the 
leaks? 
HF - I was very disappointed. Issued a press release at the time and 
I thought it was very very bad that we couldn't be trusted in 
going through all this and had rules of confidentiality and our 
staff had taken great pains to negotiate with Judge Sirica and 
others and we had gotten classified material of other committees 
and we had gotten secret grand jury testimony and everything else 
and then to for any purpose whatsoever to leak it, was to me 
totally uncalled for and hurt. Hurt the Committee at the time 
that we were subject to justified criticism in that we had been 
at this for months and months and months. By the people who 
already made up their minds one way or the other plus pot-shots 
of the President's press secretary every other day telling us what 
the confines of our proper jurisdiction was and everything else. 
And then we just lost some prestige, I think by some members 
leaking material to the press. 
TM - If we may now move and f ocus on the final week. On question number 
nine. Of the mechanics of the coalition, I had difficulty in try-
ing to note the actual meetings, when they occurred and who was 
present and frankly I'm not satisfied with this cause I remember 
I didn't take any notes. I didn't record presence and the first 
couple of meetings I didn't do anything except take a few notes 
that may have been helpful in drafting the articles. ·· But could you 
begin by telling us your earliest contacts, thoughts, about a so-
called grouping of the Committee to possibly draft articles? 
RF - Well I think the possibility of actually drafting articles was 
first mentioned at the end of the meeting by Tom Railsback _ to a 
group of us. I can't remember if it was a day or two before our 
first meeting or the preceeding Friday. It was as late as that. 
I think one of the most interesting things was that the fact that 
there was so little communication between members of the Committee 
throughout the entire process. All winter and all spring, even · 
at party caucuses. But I don't recall ever sitting down in May 
or June and discussing evidence with anybody or even into early 
July. It was a very lonely thing, for me anyway, and I assumed 
for most of the others. 
TM - Were you approached by Mr. Railsback to come to his office or do 
you have any recohlection as to that? How did you get to Mr. 
Railsback's office Tuesday morning at 8 o'clock? 
HF - I walked over . . 
LAUGHTER 
HF - That meeting was arranged on veiy short notice, I can't remem~er 
J. ..L. 0 LA. ..L.J • 
HF - whether it was the Friday before or Saturday morning we had a 
briefing I believe -- informal briefing of the Committee at which 
we discussed certain proposed articles and really narrowed the 
focus by showing a lack of interest in a few of them. 
TM - Do you recall the Friday before when Mr. Doar circulated in a black 
book drafts of different articles? Do you recall reviewing those, 
or maybe your reactions to those drafts as you looked at them? 
DFS - Was there a cause and effect between your reaction to those and 
perhaps being more receptive to Railsback's suggestion? 
~ 
HF - Have you seen my copy, by any chan~~. was that around here? 
TM - Of the Dear articles? 
HF - Yes. 
TM & DFS - No. 
HF - I guess I shipped them away with all those other papers. 
DFS - I went through all that you had left me, and I'm sure that it 
was not there. 
HF - Yes; as I recall those drafts included several dealing with the , 
same topic and just in a diffetent way of doing it. I thought it 
( would be tremendously valuable that we sit down and discuss them 
- and it seemed to me almost from the start that I felt they needed 
considerable reworking. So I was very receptive. But this was 
the first time that we had any talk about getting together as 
a group. There had been some talk around about who might vote for 
impeachment, which was a surprise. I was always included in a 
group of four or five possibles or persuadables, or what ever 
magazines wanted to list us. Play those kind of games that they 
like to do. Aside from one lunch at the Capitol Hill Club with 
Bill Cohen and Butler in which - I was interested in what Butler's 
point of view was because of another souihernor telling me how 
difficult it was going to be for him and the Southerners in Congre$ 
if he should vote for impeachment. 
TM - What time was this, this date? 
HF - It was a full week before we started on Wednesday or Thursday, ~ 
week before they started the telivised heariµgs. I really wanted 
to sound out Butler. And tell him this message that a fellow 
southerner was sympathetic to hsi problem and hoping he wouldn't 
let it bother him. I found Butler to be very tough. And got the 
opinion that he might well be disposed to vote for impeachment. 
But no one ever said that they were going to. Very frankly, you 
know, I don't think any of us wanted, you know darn well that I 
didn't want to be the only one. No matter how you felt -- I'm 
just humble enough to have grave doubts as to whether I can 
be right and everybody else wrong. It's nice that a few other 
"~ 
HF - people arrived at the same conclusion. But they did. And you are 
not quite so confident in yourself that you can just be number one. 
And of course that lot fell on Tom Railsback who had the most 
difficult decision simply by virtue of sen~roity. He had to be 
the lead off. We didn't really discuss this. 
TM - Do you recall the first moments of that first meeting? 
HF - Yeah. I was just going to get to it. Even then I remember very 
vividly that there had really been no detailed explanation as to 
what we were going to do and except the seven of us were going to 
meet. I guess when ·Tom asked me to come to that meeting it was 
the first time I knew that those three Southern Democrats would 
be involved with us. Even willing to sit down with us, I mean I 
had absolutely no contact with anybody up to that time. No, I 
think it was very interesting when we got in that room because 
Tom Railsback started off almost immediately talking in terms of 
alternatives to impeachment. Whether or not we could go with 
intent or something else. 
DFS - Censure. 
HF - Censure, you're right. And Flowers, he said something in his 
usual colorful way, I wish I could recall. Flowers certainly 
had an open mind at that _ time. I just wanted to comment on the 
options as I siad to Railsback, we'd been down this road to me 
we'd tried all thses things had happened. Try to give the 
Federal Courts jurisdiction over to enforce our subpoenas. All 
these attempts we'd made really were nothing more than to try 
to share a burden Burt Jenner kept reminding us we could not 
share cause we had the sole responsibility. He kept bringing 
us back to focus on these issues as we tried to get away from it 
and to share the burden. It really was left to us to decide the 
issue of impeachment and nothing short of it. We'd passed the 
point of anything short of that, up or down that could be decided. 
I wish I could remember, did Walter tell you what he said? 
I was trying to remember that. He made a great remark. Had to 
do with his being sick. ~is stomach or something was -tied up in 
knots the last couple of days. 
DFS - Yeah, and when he had walking pneumonia too, as it turned out. 
Also his ulcer was acting up. 
HF - Was it his ulcer that was bothering him? 
DFS - Yeah. 
HF - He talked about his ulcer bo~. Yeah, I remember Flowers 
~~a-cl1anc:lthat and then Rail's comment 
and my comment about Mr. Jenner -- he didn't talk a great deal but 
he is always right on the point. He kept it point in the right 
direction many, many times by reminding us that we were the sole 
responsibility and that we couldn't delegate it as much as we'd 
like to. Settle for contempt or settle for censure or getting 
the courts involved. I think all it is perfectly understandable 
feeling efforts to have someone in the act to take the heat 
with you. But Mr. Railsback did not pursue this for more than a 
Fish - 17. 
HF - few minutes. But after I made my comment, I think he just wanted 
to really make sure that everybody had really come to a conclusion 
again separately that there was no backing away from this. 
TM - I was trying to recollect that Flowers' comment. He siad a couple 
of things. One of the things was talking about something to the 
effect that knowing what we know, can we walk away from this thing? 
Or something like that. 
HF - No, I was thinking about the remark about his stomach. · I thought 
he meant that he had been so upset in the last couple of days ---
DFS - That was literally true, I thought. 
HF - In coming to a decision that he made himself sick. 
TM - He had pneumonia at the time. He had it for three months and 
didn't even know it, walking pneumonia. 
DFS - On top of that ulcer. He said it took him 
get back in kind of condition. There is a 
contrast to that the adjective "fragile". 
is the more accurate? Was the coalition a 
thing or was it all that "fragile"? 
about three months to 
9 b there and then in 
What do you think really 
natural, inevitable 
HF - I don't know why Tom used the words ".fragile coalition" at one 
point in the proceedings there. It wasn't a bit fragile that I 
knew of. In fact I don't even know if it was a coalition? I 
didn't think it was a coalition when I first met with them. I 
began to realize how important it was because of the makeup of the 
Committee. But if seven decided to go the other way, why we 
would have had a totally different result. "Natural" I guess is ·· 
the best word. It certainly was not inevitable or obvious. But 
I think it was natural because I said at the time about misery 
loving company, or liking company. It was a miserable experience 
to be going through. I was perfectly willing to confess that I 
did want company. I don't think that it would have been at all 
easy to explain if I had been the only Republican around, or if 
any Republican had been the only Republican to vote for it. 
TM - Would you look at the meetings that I've got listed there. I 
recall very definitely of you being there the first time. 
HF - I tell you I want to also say that I had very little to do beyond 
article one. There was alot of trouble with article two if you 
recall. 
TM - Yes. 
HF - My contribution was I think later on after the televised hearings 
gagan, I think article two came back to us with substantial 
changes. And my contribution was don't accept any of the changes, 
it's gotta be the way we agreed on. You couldn't monkey with it. 
They backed off as I remember. 
TM - This is article two? 
HF - Yeah, wasn't it. 
TM - Yeah, well you know we never even ~ot to article two until Wednes-
day. 
HF - Oh, we didn't get it finalized until Friday sometime. 
TM - Yeah. We hadn't started on it until late Wednesday. That was the 
first time we got it started cause Mr. Mann, never did bring it 
· back. At the first meeting it was kind of like Republicans take 
care of the cover-up and the Democrats would kind of take care of 
the abuse of power. 
HF - That's what I say. Maybe that's why I didn't have so much to do 
with article two. But I remember that in article one I thought 
our position was very good. We talked about each one of the 
specifications and knocked out a couple and just didn't want any-
thing in there where you could give three or four examples of 
evidence that we had would justify it-and I could give you three 
or four bits of evidence that would cast doubt on it. We didn't 
want anything like that in there. We went over each section of 
the article and discussed the, what part of the evidence related 
to it and how strong was it; we really wanted this thing to hold 
up and we were more limited than the article as proposed to us. 
TM - You know there are meetings there that you remember attending that 
,,..._ I don't have you down for? 
HF - No, As I say after the first couple on Article I ... 
TM - I definitely remember you being there the first one and the Wednee-
day morning one. 
HF - The Wednesday morning one, yes, the afternoon one I was not present 
at. 
TM - Do you remember attending any of the two dinners they had at the 
Capitol Hill Club? On Thursday. On Friday? 
HF - .No. There 
meetings. 
night? 
DFS - Wednesday 
was so mu-ch 




on I didn't have time to get to these 
our televised hearings. Thursday 
TM - We were actually drafting in Railsback's office until late that 
afternoon till six or six-thirty. 
DFS - When you walked in that first Tuesday morning were there any men 
there over and above three Southern Democrats that you were 
surprised to see there? Or surprised not to see there? 
EF 
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- No. I think I did raise the question as to why didn't we have 
McClory. Didn't we keep McClory advised what we were doin g and 
send him copies of the drafts? 
- We did on Wednesday afternoon when Mcclory called and Frank Will(?) 
called for him and said, ''We heard there is a group drafting and 
frankly you know if possibily we can get together?" I brought it 
back to the coalition and they said well rather than inviting 
Mcclory to join, they would send Mc Clary the draft. So they were 
at that point sending him drafts. 
HF - I think I raised the issue, I'd heard from something Froehlich 
said to somebody and I was floored that he was a prospect. I said 
why had he been approached, why wasn't he included and Hogan had 
he been asked - and McClory. I didn't see why they weren't there. 
TM - Do you recall on Friday when Mr Sarbanes introduced the Sarbanes 
substitute which was in substance the coalition's draft of article 
one? And the attack that followed, John Wiggins and Sandman, do 
you remember your reactions to that? 
HF - Well I wasn't part of that. Obviously this had been a planned 
strategy on the part of the opponents of the impeachment that I 
hadn't expected or been alerted that was coming out. I guess Paul 
had only seen the draft shortly before, hadn't he. I guess that 
showed. 
TM - Did you think they were in danger? Did yoc think this was going 
to hold up? Did it seem to be faltering? 
HF - No, I thought it became obvious that this was the strategy of delay 
and causing a whole series of votes and striking each one of those. 
I remember really not wanting the thing to go this ro~te because 
the motion to strike each section of article one would be tanamount 
to a vote on the merits of the issue. 
DFS - What were your views on the Kastenmeier resolution, the vote on 
each article separately rather than the understanding previously 
that it would be one vote? 
HF - Well, that I was very disappointed because --- I don't know if 
anybody knows this -- even it was a week before that during sort of 
a lull in the proceedings in the Committee Room I had asked Rodino 
that if we could vote at the end of the whole thing and I said I 
felt that it would make it easier for me and a number of other 
people. And he agreed, And then we didn't mention it again but 
I gathered that at the Democratic Caucus he lined them all up and 
it was, of course, I haven't told this to other members on my side 
but I know afterwards Eilberg was very upset and cross with 
Kastenrneier because it had all been understood and agreedto in the 
Democratic Caucus and of course when Kastenmeier did object to the 
rules of procedure -- but he objected to it as being not the usual 
order. Re had a slight majority of the Republicans voting with 
him who were anti-impeachment Republicans and didn't know.any of 
\ 
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:e1~l i 1f"i.ppi~~ - :!~~1ir1 :; t'l ,,c ·!':e all tot:;~t:1er ::ha;.1 <)nc at a tin?-e. 
DFS - During th~t ~ze~ ~~at was yuur view of the McClory idea end 
HF 
even i.:: l' al iy ,._,.,_· ,~ :_ c 1 I'.! t i1 ;:- -2 e? ~ 1l'hac rul r! did t11at ?J. 2.::/ in the Cf:tal :i.::::_~)'(_, 
I -remer,ib~ ·.c ':t., r / ·,;; ,:=, J.l and OE!'.:<'= ;_,3 ;,in. thi:; i,-=, :1 :_Ja:-ticul;1r C]u:.i. i~~: ;, · .. ·t.·, '. 
only ~.:ould ';_,(! revE:<.lc:d in a very •:lose n~ading cf the Commit::ee 
report. I voted against article three. But I signed the suppl~m-
tary views of M~ McCJory in the bo~k, in the record of the hear-
ings in 1avu~ 0~ article three. I changed my nind. There was~'c 
really enough discussion that -- t?1ere wer2 two or three articles 
that we gove ve:-y cursory attentio~ to in the evidentiary hearin t ~ 
with a half-&ay on th~ basics of cv2rything. In the case of 
artilce three, thinking about it afterwards, I think it is 
necessary to cstohlish that impeachmett 0ffense because it goe s tc, 
the heart of the acthority of Congress to impeach in the first 
place. And the fact that the President did come up with the tnpe 
of JunE 23rd finally -- pursuaded me to sign his views in favo~ 0£ 
article th:r"""---:-- . Had h!:? given us that tape wh2n he ::;aid in May tha': 
he would :revie•,.• these things; that!!3 ,;.·hen he found it anywa7. T:1 ,c 
Republican~ ~ho voted against impeachment wo~ld not have been put 
through all this . And then a week later said they would not vote 
for lmpcach~cnt. Totally ~nnecessary that those men had been put 
through that ~=ingcr, if that t~pe had been produced and we had 
subpoe~ed it two months earlier. 





- Yes. It h a ~ 112ver been pic~eJ up t~at I slgned McClory's supp~.s-
mental views anrl I tl1ink that's v~r y sig~ific2nt, having votc2 
against it. But it's just thai I chnnge<l m7 mind in the inter-
vening w~ck b2fare the do~cmcnt~- ha d to be published. 
- I don't know if I satisfied Torn a b out the 
ask yoc a question because I never ~eally 
take th~s~ t~ings~ Ui~ he go away and be 
he come ~ack with Lome comuents ? 
calendar here? Le:: m~ 
knew where did Mann, 
back the n~xt day? Di<l 
TM - That still ~urauins to being kind of~~ inter~sting thing that I'm 
s u re t he Co;,:. l 5- '.: i o 1, w i LL pt~:::- s '.l '= m 0 r 1f' c 1 o s el y down a t the Hi 1 ton 
Head. Wh~~ ~~ ~~uw now in talking with Mr. Mann Yas that there 
was 2. iroup of Der:io1:r2t::; -- E<lw.:rd::;, and Cor::,e:-~ 2nd Sarba11es an ,l 
Brooks. 
DFS - Thos2 ~our in yar t icular. 
EF - Were they official? 
o v e r t h e r,1 a t (! r i a l ? 
You r.:e:1r: t112 Chairman had asked them to work 
ri::;u - Ll.. 
TM - They were semi-official anyway 
HF - Work over the Doar book on all the alternatives, you mean? 
TM - I dori't know this, but my impression is that they were constituted 
to review the work product of the Coalition. 
HF - Oh, I think they were in existance before we started. 
TM - I don't know. 
TM - Well the Donohue article one is a rough drate of one of our earlier 
drafts. 
HF - Oh really, I thought it was the Doar product. 
TM - No, and article two was an early product of Mann which none of us 
had seen before it was there on the table. He was not willing to 
even show us the night before he hande ti out rather reluctantly to 
the Coalition. But Mann says there was a group of Democrats that 
he did go to once. I think he said and he didn't work with them 
as such, they weren't rehashing the work. 
HF - Well did they do anything? 
TM - Our information is that they weren't doing anything except acting 
as a sounding board. 
HF - Well there was John Doar who made revisions on ours -- kind of 
changes --
DFS - John Doar worked very closely with Mr. Mann personally, daily. 
TM - Mr mann was not taking our product through a Democratic Steering 
Committee of any kind. Although he did on one occassion meet 
with them and recalls not meeting any more than that. 
HF - I think it's interesting. I think you'd have to get this part of 
the story from John Doar, and it would be interesting to talk · to 
Edwards, I think. Here was this other gr6up with the majority 
of the Republicans who were writing stuff and they didn't have any 
control over it and they must have had some mixed feelings. 
DFS - Mr. Mann strongly suggested and we will interview John Doar. 
HF - Oh yeah, well he's key, and Jenner too I think . you shouldn't miss. 
I don't know if other members felt about him the was I did but 
I spent Saturday with over in fue office. I went over to read. We 
kept our black books over there and I did for a while and then 
I took them home but I was reading there this Saturday and he was 
there and just happened to talk. His just an extraordinarily 
gifted man. He just hung it entirely on the Constitution. 
That is where I started and where I ended, at the Constitution and 
there it was. 
Fish - 22. 
DFS - I asked Mr. Mann a direct question, just the other day, how was it 
that he was selected er emerged as thi s -- g o between? 
And just frankl y he didn't know. He thought it was because of his 
low-key image as he calls it. 
HF - Didn•t he come to us, riidn't he co me to the Coalition, Tom, with 
a draft · of article o~e? And article two? Isn't that· his original 
work product? 
TM - You mean the first mGeting, yes, he had something roughed out. 
Which we haven't seen to this day. Thornton had something that he 
roughed out, which we have copies of. They did that the night 
before in a Deetin g . 
HF - You're satisfied that this is not something that came out of the 
Edwards committee? They didn't really have anything -- an origi~· 
nal draft of that? 
SECOND TAPE 
SL - We can begin with number two if you would like. What was your 
immediate reaction that nig~t after the vote on article one? 
DFS - On Saturday night. 
SL - And your subsequent actions later that evening? 
( HF - I sure do. I remember just wanting to walk out of the place; my 
wife was there and I don't know, we just held hands and walked out 
of the room and down the hall. I didn't want to talk to anybody. 
Or that big setup that the news people had you know with the 
cameras by the front door of the Rayburn Building. I do remember 
that I'd seen in the audience Art Buchwald, and he had a strip 
that the counsel had of all the names and how they voted. He had 
it and he checked it off and he came up and asked me to autograph 
if for him. And I said something about that I should be actually 
asking for your autograph. And we left and it was then about, 
what? We voted around 7:20 or 7:30? 
TM - 7 o'clock. 
SL - Right, 7:05. 
HF - Well I remember that our first stop was going to the supermarket 
on McArthur Boulevard where we had to stop off cause my wife, 
Billy, had spent the last two days in the hearing room. And so 
we were going to g o home and get something to _eat and so we had to 
buy some food. It just struck me as amusing the, I really just was 
absolutely drained and I found myself standing behind one of those 
metal baskets in the Safeway and having to stand about half an 
hour in line to get to the checkout ~erson. And having just 
gone through something that was farily significant. And we went 
home and really what my recollection was that how quiet it was. 
I'd had one telegrnm from a friend that had been around the house 
in ~he afternoon, it was very nice. But the phone didn't ring. 
Just no telegrams arrived. No telephone calls. I don't know 
(__ 
Fish - 23. 
HF - why I expected it, that there might be some phone calls, but 
there weren't. And the ne x t morning, we'd already decided this, 
we packed up and went out to the eastern shore in Maryland and just 
to have lunch and nap and spend the night and drive back Monday 
morning. To be exact we went to a restraurant wehre they had tons 
of hardshell crabs .. Just had a nap that afternoon and got up and 
had dinner and went back to bed and ca~e in Monday morning. I 
guess we drove right to the Capitol cause we were at it again 
10:30 Monday morning. Well that's really all that happened ritht 
after. 
SL - During the actual vote itself, some of the members in • previous 
interviews expressed the views that they thought certain members 
of the Committee were acting as they were polling for the cameras. 
That they had been preparing themselves for the vote. 
HF - I remember being a little surprised at the way people announced 
their vote -- particularly the ayes is what you heard first and 
they were very soft. And I was surprised initially and --
SL 
but after several of them it seemed a very natural thing. I · 
don't think you have to attribute it to acting. What are you going 
to do? Smile and say "aye''? I heard afterwards that the Chairman 
was deeply upset. There was some report that he was sick. You 
can't say that nobody was acting but I don't think it was the 
kind of aye vote that you wanted to shout out. 
- The three articles, how do you think they would have fared in the 
House and then subsequently in the Senate? 
HF - Oh, I think they would have passed the House and fn the ~enate. I 
never did see any particular problem by the time I got to the 
point which was the 11th hour to go for impeachment. To me it had 
to be a very very good case and I think the preparation, the work 
that John Doar had done, in preparing matters on the part of the 
House for the Senate. Why it had been a totally convincing case. 
DFS - Just on that score you say the - 11th hour and it is something we 
really haven't asked in this direct fashion, can you recall when 
did you in your own mind come to that? 
HF - It was certainly within a week -- no further back than a week 
before. I don't know there was any particular moment but I'd say 
the Saturday or Sunday before the vote had started. But once 
again I'm not saying that I wasn't influenced a couple of days 
later by realizing that there were at least four Republicans and 
maybe more. But frankly I never had any interest in being a mana-
ger on the part of the House in that stage of going before the 
Senate. I didn't feel I was one of them that had a good a grasp 
or that good a lawyer as others could have been to do that job. 
Oh, yes, you asked me about how it would fare? Rodino would stop 
us two or three times a day on the floor and talk about it mean-
while the 10 Republicans were meeting together and didn't invite 
us. But we started right away thinking in terms of the presenta-
tion to the House and I think initially we were talking about 80 or 
90 hours of debate. Much of the first 15 would be controlled 
by the Committee, I think. I did favor at least a minimum amount 
of debate of 5 hours in the House vote. By that time the 
r 
Fish - 24. 
BF - President had resigned and Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Rodino didn't 
have any interest in it whatsoever. I'm not so sure that they 
are right. Almost immediately there was almost an educational 
process for the balance of the House who had read the newspaper 
accoutnts for the last several wonths but still wanted to be 
throughly educated in this thing and we had two or three 
opportunities to do so. I guess it must have been Wednesday 
Railsback and Cohen and I met with the Wednesday group and plus 
others like 40 of the House Republicans and each took a topic and 
discussed it with them and answered questions. There w~re helpful 
comments. Rails was awfully good on article one and somebody 
made a suggestion that he repeat that for the camera which is 
basically what he did. Then we met in John Rhodes' office. 
He had the nine members of the Republican leadership and now I'm 
switching to after the votes, after the completion of all five 
articles • In this educational process we met in John Rhodes, .· 
office with the 9 members of leadership plus about one half a dozen 
other Republicans and I don't know why or what basis he picked them 
and Wiggins and myself. He just wanted to explore how we went 
about this and Wiggins said we would just kind of meet in small 
groups on a daily basis until the debate started on the House 
floor and to present this side of it and he had already met with 
a couµle of them. And I presented the other side of the argument 
and the answers and the questions. And I think we would have --
had events not caught up with us so quickly. I think there 
would have been a great deal of this material being handed out, 
somebody wanted my Summary of Information. Before that was 
printed members wanted to borrow my copy and - study it. There was 
a tremendous amount of interest in this. We really spent our 
time just doing that. I think that would have served, that plus 
debate in the House, to carry the day quite easily. 
SL - Do you think future generations now have a clearer definition of 
an impeachable offense? 
HF - I doubt it. I don't think if you run out and ask the man in the 
street -- he might have khown a year ago but he would~'t know now. 
Yes. As I said I guess one of the documents the inquiry staff put 
out, was that Constitutional Grounds ofr Impeachment. I said 
repeatedly that even if the President was not impeached that 
what we did in terms of work product, would be required reading 
for Presidents for generations to come. The basic documents put 
out by the Committee, which we had to start from scratch because 
there was no book around saying "How to Impeach." That stuff is 
there and will serve as a standard. 
DFS - And over and above the comcept of impeachment, what do you think 
are the beneficial effects of the whole affair, now that it is 
over, on our system of government? 
HF - Well hardly a weekend goes by when I'm back in New York State that 
I don't run into three or four people who will comment on this. 
People that I haven't seen or never have met for the first time or 
just hadn't seen since before last July, who have nothing-but high 
marks for the conduct of the Committee. Really they say very 
flattering things in terms of what it meant to them to see the 
-(-
. , Fish - 25. 
HF - anquish that each of the members went through or that it was 
a restoration of their faith in the government or the rule of 
law being applied as it should be or the Constitution being upheld 
and followed properly. 
DFS - You know it's been remarked that up to say last August that the 
White House had become almost a fourth brance of government. Do 
you think that is an overstatement or do you think there was some 
danger of that and it was corrected? 
HF - Yes. I don't necessarily think thit's an overstatement. Put 
another way it's been called the imperial Presidency. And I don't 
see that as a reflection on Mr. Nixon's personality in any way. I 
think that is was historical for~es that had worked for years in 
this country that had to do largely with abrogation of Congres-
sional powers in foreign policy and war policy. Again a very 
natural thing in its leading to the executive to deal with large 
social problems. Ever since the beginning of this century that 
the Congress simply legisl~tes and sets ~pan agency and then 
leaves it to the executive to administer the thing and goes on 
to the next problem. So suddenly you find an .agency or depart-
ment with thousands and thousands of employees and you get this 
bureaucratic response to these problems and the Congress is not 
doing the job in oversight either. I think you are going to see in 
the last few years a restoration of that, a realization on the part 
of the Congress that it did give up too much~ The imperial 
Presidency was almost demanded by the force of events. 
DFS - And looking back too, how would you evaluate the treatme~t by the 
media of your work of the committee's work, of the whole impeach-
ment process? Was . it generally fair, slanted, adequate? 
HF - No, I thought it was excellent. It had I don't know how many 
reporters were assigned just to us and it gradually grew during 
the winter and spring. As you entered the Rayburn Building 
horseshoe drive, origianlly you had a few television cameras set 
up there, and I used to joke with them about the fox-holes 
area because pretty soon that curtain was there across this large 
expance and then they had rugs and desks and the foxholes there. 
Pretty soon they'd have hot and cold runnign Scotch and everything 
else in there. (LAUGHTER) It wasn't far from the mark. You just 
leave the fellows there long enough and they begin to bring in the 
comofrts. But they were very good, they had a tough job because 
we had so much behind closed doors but I thought that the 
Washington Post, which I get every morning at home, pieced it 
together -- the acounts of what we heard behind closed doors, 
evidentiary presenation were very very accurate in the Post. 
Did you get that, Tom? 
TM - Yeah, in many cases they were verbatum. 
MORE LAUGHTER 
HF - Personally speaking of myself, the · press was very fair to me and 
I'd say mroe than generous. 
DFS - And how do you think -- of course your district was different from 
Butler's or someone else's -- your own re-election was affected 
C 
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DFS - by your role in the impeachment proceedings? 
HF - Well the net effect was a plus for me. I mean I won by 65.5% of 
the vote which was down from 72.5% in 1972. But you know in a 
Republican district it is pretty hard to lose in 1972. And that 
fall off was not what the Republican Congressional Campaign 
Committee had told us in a meeting in September what we could 
expect. I think their figures were a 10% fall off. I didn't 
realize a 10% fall off. Another reason for thinking the 65.5% 
was a pretty good percentage was because about 45,000 people 
failed to vote in '74 who had voted in '72. My Democratic opponent 
got within 1,000 votes of two different candidates. The candidate 
for '72 had a thousand more votes than the candidate for ~74. My 
bote was 40,000 less. I think that basically a lot of Republicans 
a lot of independents were just disgusted or embarassed to be 
Democrats or Republicans, didn't come to the polls. And an awful 
lot of Democrats and Republicans who did go to the polls voted for 
me. This is kind of a guess at the cause you are never going to 
know who voted and who they voted for. ' r know some -Republicans 
were against me so I think since that vote stayed static and a 
number of Republicans voted against me that I must have picked 
up a lot of Democratic votes. 
' DFS - As you thought about impeachment and studied it and finally voted 
on it, did the Johnson trial of 100 years ago or the ethics of 
Congressmen today as in the Wiley-Mayne milk motion have any 
influence on you? 
HF - Well, Johnson, I just to put down this as a bad example of how to 
go about this and I referred to it ' recently in a speech and the 
corollary to the N~xon White House as the wrong way to do things. 
Do you recall the Wiley-Mayne resolution in March 
HF - Yes, he said if Congressmen are doing this can we well impeach the 
President? 
HF - Yeah, I was in favor of Wiley gettin this through. What I did in 
early July was to write a Rabbi Marks, of the First Hebrew 
Congregation of Peekskill, and the Presbyterian Minister in 
Poughkeepsie, New York, Paul Rutgers, and the Episcopal Minister, 
who married me and who is a liberal, and just asked them for 
their thoughts on what we were going through. And they didn't 
know that I had talked to the others, and each one wrote me quite 
alot, several pages of their approach to this thing and the inter-
esting thing was the similarity. I think I mentioned here I used 
the term "the sacred vessel of the law" referring to the Constitu-
tion, naturally, which was of course in the letter to me from 
the Rabbi. And then one of them delt with this question and that 
was in the mails heavily about "he who casts the first stone". 
And we used to get little pebbles in the mail scotch taped to a 
piece of cardboard. And I lifted almost verbatum form a letter 
by Paul Rutgers.-- is anyone virtuous enough to decide the 
weighty issue before us? It suggested that we are all guilty, that 
civic unrightousness is collective. If I were to accept this 
thesis, if I -and my colleagues can no longer separate our· sins from 
those of others, we are no longer capable of making any worthwhile 
. . ' 
jud gments whatsoever. That was lifted directly from Paul Rutgers 




Fish - 27. 
HF - Well I thought that should be mentioried, that was big at the time. 
So I thought that issue ought to be hit. But basically what I 
was talking about and which I repeated during the debate was the 
thrust of my supplemental views was the actual duty imposed on 
hte President by the Constitution by sparce language of article 
two. These dtFties are very clear and they were violated. I think 
that was really the heart of the whole thing. Very few other 
members bore down on it. I was helped here by a couple of members 
of the inquiry staff. 
DFS - For example I read in your papers that you left me those three or 
four draft chapters from James Caleb Beach, Reasonabl~ Men, .and 
your taping with Lucas; but I still might ask, What now in the 
10 months after the fact, May '75 has caused you to finally give 
us this time and record your recollections once agin? Would you 
have done this to this extent last fall? 
HF Mr. Beach wanted to write a gook not just about me but also ·the 
historical thing and then following the whole process but 
then talking terms of just my changing or my maturing or consider-
ation of this issue. I just didn't want to do it. I'm dilighted 
I said at the time back at the end of last year that I thought 
something written about the seven of us would be goo. I didn't 
want ~o be singled out. Treated separately in this would have 
blown totally out of proportion as to my contribution to that. 
But certainly after the receGs in the House in early August, I just 
was so physically and emotionally spent that I just .didn't want 
to talk to anybody. I didn't even consider it then. It really 
was a couple of months before I was myself again. So I didn't 
want to proceed with any book, just featuring myself but I did 
remember writing Mr. Beach and or he wrote me and suggested this 
and I thought it was a good idea back in the fall. And since 
then I gather that potential phase tow, after Hilton Head and 
after everybody had put down their thoughts is that they might be 
given to a writer. And talking to you, Tom, that we needed a 
writer, we just couldn't sit down, the seven of us and write 
different chapters, first of all it wouldn't be good literature and 
secondly you couldn't possibly get them to stay on any kind of a 
deadiine or timetable. We needed the discipline of a writer who 
would not just simply chronicle but would have a theme and a 
beginning and a middle and an end and a focus to the thing. Maybe 
even start to pull this all together. 
TM - Okay, excellent, I think we are done. Thank you Congressman. 
